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ABSTRACT

The literature on agency costs has established that the introduction of
outside equity results in conflicts betl.een ne1,7 mmers and management that
lO1,7ers the value of the firm.

In contrast, this paper, by focusing on

management-labor conflicts, demonstrates that the value of the firm can be
increased by the introduction of outside equity.

We obtain this result by

sho1,7ing that the bargaining position of the o1,7ner-manager is enhanced 1,7hen
outside equity is increased.

As a result, 1,7orkers with firm-specific skills are

persuaded to accept a lm.er 1,7age, and hence the value of the firm increases.

OWNERSIlIP STRUCTURE, VALUE OF TilE FIRM,
AND TIlE BARGAINING POWER OF TIlE MANAGER
I.

Introduction

In their seminal article, Michael Jensen and William Meckling developed a
theory of the corporate OImership structure that took into account lithe
trade-offs available to the entrepreneur-manager betHeen inside and outside
equity and debt '! (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p. 312).

Jensen and Yeckling

concentrated on the principal-agent problem and the agency costs that arise from
the introduction of outside equity into the firm.
consideration of

I~hat

This Has done without any

effects such an action might have had on the bargaining

power of the OImer- manager

III

negot iating

I~ages I~i th

the current employees of

the firm.
Several years later

~Iasahiko

Aoki (1980; 1984, Chapter 5) introduced a

model of the firm that emphasized flits aspect as a quasi-permanent organization
of stockholders and employees ll (1980, p. 600).

He asserted that as a result of

the association Hith the firm, the employees acquire skills and knoHledge that,
I.hen combined

I~i th

the physical assets supplied by the stockholders, can produce

some economic gains -- the so-called organizational rent.

Such rents would not

be possible through the employment of external factors of production (such as
workers that have no knowledge of the workings of the firm).

The organizational

rent can be produced only through the cooperation of the stockholders (supplying

the physical assets) and the existing employees.

As such, the situation is

tantamount to a tHo-person cooperative game, and the question becomes, hOH then
is the organizational rent to be distributed

betl~een

stockholders and employees.

Aoki proposed that the solution to this particular distribution problem could be
accomplished by use of a bargaining process attributed to Frederik Zeuthen and
John Harsanyi that leads to the Nash bargaining solution.
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Implicit In Aoki's analysis was that all equity was outside equity.
Therefore, no attent ion was given to how alternat i ve OImership structures of the
firm affect (1) the bargaining po\.er of the manager and (2) the distribution of
the organizational rent.

One could start out with an owner-managed firm and

examine the distribution of the organizational rent under such an o\.nership
structure.

It \wuld then be important to understand hOI. the introduct ion of

outside equity into the f irm

~

la Jensen and

~Ieclding,

\wuld affect, if at all,

the distribution of the organizational rent.
This paper demonstrates that the introduction of outside equity into a
heretofore o\.ner-managed firm increases the bargaining power of a risk averse
o\mer-manager.

As a result, the employees' share in the organizational rent

will decrease, \.hich will in turn lead to an increase in the value of the firm.
Section II of this paper introduces a simple model of the firm that makes
possible the explicit derivation of the organizational rent from the existing
market conditions.

In addition, Section II sets the stage for the bargaining

process that determines the distribution of the organizational rent bet\.een
stockholders and skilled workers.

This process takes the form of negotiations

for the determination of a wage rate for skilled workers (and, therefore, the
capitalized value of the firm).
The bargaining process itself, and the conditions for reaching an
equilibrium, are described in Section III.

Thereafter in Section IV, we

conclude \.ith an examination of the introduction of outside equity, its effects
on the manager r S bargaining pOl.er and, through that, its effects on the
equilibrium of the bargaining process and the value of the firm.
An Appendix contains the more technical derivations and mathematical
proofs.
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II.

The Model

'{e consider a firm that at period t, given the price per unit of output,
Pt' announced at the end of last period, faces a set of outstanding orders
representing a quantity qt for its product.

The manager must decide on the

quantity to produce, q (q ~ qt) at the given price.

For purposes of simplicity,

I;e assume al;ay the possibility of negative inventories (i. e., backlogging) or
positive inventories, so that unfilled orders represent lost sales. l
To introduce the concept of what Aoki (1980) refers to as organizational
rent, \;e assume that, given the existing amount of capital, the employment of

outside workers without firm-specific skills and knOl;ledge, at a market wage
rate wo ' enables the firm to fill outstanding orders representing the quantity
qo' qo < qt' of its product. Given a discount rate r, let yO represent the
capitalized value of the firm under this policy (\~here yO > 0).
Workers, through their association with the firm for at least one period,
acquire firm-specific skills so that their retention by the firm, augmented by
the possible addition of unskilled workers, will enable the firm to fill the
entire set of outstanding orders, i.e., produce and sell qt.
Let C(qt;

\~ 0)

and C(qo; w0) be the costs to the firm for produc ing

quant it ies qt and qo' respect i vely, assuming the skilled and unskilled Iwrkers
are paid the same

I~age

rate wo'

Then,

represents the organizational rent that would result from the cooperation of
skilled workers with the firm in time period t.

It is further assumed that

lIn a bargaining model the possibility of positive or negative inventories may
alter the bargaining power of management and labor. This is not considered
here.

t > O. The skills of workers with at least one time period's experience with
the firm are firm-specific; they cannot be used outside the firm. Therefore, if
7

they seek alternative employment these workers will not be able to earn more
than the market

\~age

rate

\~o.

As suggested in the introduction, this implies

that the model is equivalent to a
is

t\~o-person

cooperative game and the question

hO\~ 7

t will be distributed between skilled \wrkers and the stockholders of
the firm.
To explore this question, let us suppose that the part of lit gOIng to
skilled workers will be determined by the wage rate wt that these workers
negotiate at the beginning of each period t I~i th the management of the firm.
That is, wt = Wo + ut \~here ut ~ o and ut represents that portion of the wage
rate received by skilled workers that emanates from the organizational ren t. As
a consequence, given

\~o

and the discount rate r: the capitalized value of the

firm can be expressed as a function of wt ' ,~ith V(I~O) representing its ma'CImum
value, i.e., where the entire organizational rent lit goes to the stockholders of
the firm.
Alternatively, V(w o + ~t/Nt-l) represents the firm1s mInImum value, i.e.,
when the entire organizational rent ~t goes to the skilled workers of the firm:
that is, the Nt - 1 I{orkers employed at period t-l. V(w t ) is a linear function of
wt ' with VI (w t ) < 0. 2 Therefore the capitalized value of the firm can be
represented as in Figure 1.

2For given r, if the firm receives a fraction 8 of "t and skilled workers
receive a fraction (1-8) of ~t' then V(w t ) = V(w o) + 8"t/(1 + r),
and I~t = \~o + (1- 8) ~t/Nt-l'
But 8"t = ~t - (I~t - wo)N t - 1 ·
(w t - wo)N t _ 1J (1 + r)
Therefore V(w t ) = V(w o) + [~t
= V(I~O) + ["t + \{oN t - 1] (1 + r) - [:''\-1/(1 + r)JI{t.

;)

- - - - - - - - - - - " - - - \~t

V(\~o + 1l"t/ Nt_l)

Bargaining Possibilities Frontier
FIGURE 1

The curve V(\\) represents the "bargaining possibilities frontier" \vhere skilled
Horkers prefer points close to the \v't- a.,'(is Hhile stockholders prefer points
close to the V- a.'(is .

III.

The Bargaining Process

In the negotiation process for the determination of the Hage rate H (and,
t
therefore, the value of the firm V(\~t))' \"e assume that the "typical" skilled
\wrker is guided by a von Neumann- ~Iorgenstern utility indicator UL

I~i th \~age

rate \~t as its sole argument, and \~e assume that UU\~t) > 0, UL(\~t) < O.
Like\~ise,

the manager of the firm is guided in the negotiation process by a

von Neumann-Jlorgenstern utility indicator U Ivith \~ealth V as its sole argument.
M
In particular, \~e assume that the manager mms a fraction {i, 0 < {i ~ 1 of the
firm, and that h~ holds financial assets in the amount of 1{F dollars, 1{F

f O.

Therefore, for a given \~age rate for skilled Ivorkers I~t, 1{ = 11'F + (l'V(\~t)' and

6

Differentiating (2) \{ith respect to \{t \;e obtain

1{e assume that U~r(1{) > 0, U~i('{) < 0, and Uir'l ~ 0.
We are now in a position to investigate the bargaining process which can
yield a unique V and w.
Zeuthen.

The process described is largely attributable to

Harsanyi has demonstrated that the Zeuthen solution to the bargaining

problem is the Nash bargaining solution.

The description of the process closely

follows that given by Aoki.
1{ages of skilled workers are determined at the beginning of each period by
a bargaining process.

The parties to the bargaining process are management and

a representative skilled employee (Aoki, 1980, p. 604).

At the beginning of the

period each side must decide to acquiesce or bargain for a concession from the
other side.

If bargaining is undertaken each side understands that the other

side may exercise its threat to withhold cooperation. 3
The basis for negotiations is a wage rate \;t proposed by the manager, \;here
o ~ wt < Wo + r t /N t _1 . Let w;_l be the wage rate that skilled workers were
paid at period t-1. Then, the wage rate proposed by the manager, wt ' could be

W

3 Harsanyi

described the bargaining situation as follo\{s: "Bargaining situations
with one possible threat by each party arise either when the two parties can
achieve a certain gain by co-operation but when each of them can threaten to
\vithhold his co- operation unless a profit- sharing agreement satisfactory to him
is reached, or \{hen one or both parties are able to inflict one particular sort
of positive damage on the other party and use the possibility as a threat ....
But in more general situations the bargainin~ parties \{ill have a choice among
several possible threats, each involving dif~erent degrees of non-cooperative or
positively damaging behavior. Of course, if there is no obligation to carry out
threats in the absence of agreement, the choice among alternative threats may
become trivial since each party may then use the mOSt formidable threat against
his opponent as a matter of mere bluffing. To exclude this possibility, ~e may
assume that each party is forced to carry out this threat if agreement fails."
(llarsanyi, 1956, p. 146)

less than wt*- 1 ' If so, the manager is essentially asking for a concession from
the skilled workers. Alternatively he could propose a wage equal to wt*- 1 ' the
wage paid skilled workers in t-l.
The skilled workers have two strategies.

One consists of (a) accepting the

1~age

rate wt proposed by the manager; the other (b) rejecting wt and asking for
an increase equal to h. With respect to the latter case, the manager has two
strategy options.

First, the manager can accept the workers' demand for an

increase In wt by h, in which case the wage rate of skilled workers for period t
1~ill

be

1~t +

hand, as a result, the capitalized value of the firm ,.;ill be V =

* Alternatively, the manager can reject the
h), where -Y < Y(w t ) = V.
workers I demand for an increase in wt by h. In this latter case, depending upon
Y(1~t +

the workers' response, there are two possible outcomes.
can wi thdra1~ the ir demand.

(a) The skilled workers

Then, the IVage rat e remains at

1~ t

and the value of

the firm is V(w t ) = Y* ; or (b) the skilled workers can insist on their demand
resulting in either the IVorker or management withdrawing their cooperation. In
this latter case, the wage rate that skilled ,;orkers can earn by seeking
alternative employment will be 1~0 and the value of the firm 1~ill fall to yO, as
the firm has to employ unskilled workers.
If skilled workers

m~~imize

expected utility, they

1~ill

enter negotiations,

i.e., they will ask for a raise equal to h if their expected gain in utility is
greater than their expected loss.

More formally

where Pl is labor's assessment of the probability that management

1~ill

reject

labor's demand and exercise its threat to withhold cooperation thereby resulting

8

1n a \,age of

\'0.

By rearranging terms, it follows that labor will go ahead Kith

its demand for an increase in the wage rate by an increment equal to h if and
only if:
UL(W t

(5)

+

h) - UL(w t )

UL(w t + h) - UL(w o)
In (5), P1* represents the

m~ximum

risk

(m~ximum

probability of conflict) that

skilled workers are prepared to face in order to achieve the \.age increment h.
In a similar manner, the manager will follow the second of the above t\.o
strategies, i.e., he will reject the skilled workers' demand for an increase 1n
the wage rate by h, if and only if, his expected gain is greater than his
expected loss.

More formally

\.here P2 is the manager's assessment of the probability that skilled \wrkers
will insist on their demand after such a demand has been rejected by the
manager.
(7)

Rearranging terms, (6) is equivalent to
UM( ll' Y(\.t )

+ 1vF)

U~I(aY(wt)

+

-

U~I ( ll'Y(\.t +

\VF) - UM(aY

o

+

h)

+ hiF)

WF)

In (7), P2* 1S the maximum risk of conflict that management can tolerate before
accepting the workers' demand for an increase in wt by h.
*
Dividing P1(\'t'
h) by h, the \.age increment, to arrive at the

m~ximum

probability per h of conflict, and letting h approach zero, \.e arrive at LB t , a
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commonly used measure of bargaining power consistent with Aokils measure of the
employees' bargaining power.
(8)

LB, at time t:

UL(I,7t)
LB

t

= ------
UL(1,7 t) - UL(1,70)

* , h; a) by h, as h approaches zero the measure
In a like manner, dividing P2(w
t
of management I s bargaining pOl,7er, 11m, at time t is:
(9)

Following Zeuthen, we l,7ill assume that labor and management have an
accurate assessment of each others' resolve to bear the risk of conflict and
that each party will make a concession l,7hen he finds that his opponent is
prepared to bear a greater risk of conflict. 4
Under our assumptions regarding strictly concave utility functions, it is
clear that LB t is a decreasing function of l,7t Hhile ilm is an increasing
t
function of wt · Graphically the situation is represented as follows:

~Zeuthen's

behavioral assumption is formally derived In Harsanyi: p. 149-151.

10

Labor's and Management I s Bargaining

POl~er

Curves

FIGURE 2
If the manager proposes a \Vage rate smaller than IV * , such as wi:, in the above

t
diagram, LBt(wt,) > MBt(wi:,) and therefore skilled workers are prepared to bear a

greater risk of conflict than management.
labor I s demand for a higher \Vage rate.

In this case management concedes to

In a similar manner if skilled Iwrkers

rej ect the manager's proposal and demand a wage rate that is above
\V t ,

~IBt (I~t)

*

I~t,

such as

> LB t (I~t)' then management is prepared to bear a greater risk of

conflict than skilled IVorkers.

In this case the manager will reject the skilled

It is only at a IVage rate IV t = wt* that
the resolve of each party to bear risk is equalized, i.e., MBt(w *t ) = LBt(w *t ).
lyorkers' demand for a higher IVage rate.

We will refer to w*t as the equilibrium wage rate of the bargaining process,
and it will determine a unique point on the bargaining possibilities frontier
together with the respective capitalized value of the firm as established in
Figure 1. 5

5As we show in the Appendix [A.l] the equilibrium wage obtained from this
process corresponds precisely to the Nash Bargaining Solution.
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IV.

Introducing Outside Equity and the Manager's Bargaining Power

IHth a descript ion of the bargaining process in hand, \.;e are nm.; in a
position to describe how a sell off of a portion of the firm will affect the
equilibrium position on the bargaining possibility frontier.

Specifically, \.e

\.;ill investigate how V and wt systematically change from a situation where the
manager is 100% mmer to a situation where the manager sells off a portion of
the firm to outsiders. 6
Ivithout loss of generality we can assume that at the beginning of period t
the owner-manager has no financial wealth, only firm-specific wealth, and
further he owns 100% of the firm, i.e., a

= 1.

Therefore, any financial wealth

that enters his utility function must corne from a sale of a portion E,

o < E < 1,

of the firm.

the manager, a

+ E

With a representing the portion of the firm retained by

= 1.

Nmv, suppose that, faced with a demand by labor for an increase of the \.;age
rate equal to h, the owner-manager considers selling a portion E of his interest
in the firm to outsiders, thus, converting interest In the firm to financial
assets.

This conversion of interest in the firm to financial assets \.;ill

involve some wealth costs that we assume to be a function of E and denote by
I{e further assume that C(E) is continuous and t\.;ice differentiable for

C(E).

all

E

> O.

It is intended that the function C(E) captures all \.;ealth costs that result
from the transactions involved in converting interest in the firm to financial
assets.

In particular, \.;e assume that (a) the mmer- manager \.;ill be retained in

his role as a manager under the new ownership structure of the firm at least for

6The conclusions of this section \.;ill not be altered if the manager initially
owned less than 100% of the firm.
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the current period, and (b) acting in his o\{n best interests, his managerial
tasks will include negotiating a wage rate with the skilled \.orkers.

Therefore,

in addition to any other costs, such as commissions paid to third parties and
income

t~xes

on capital gains, it is intended that the cost function c(e)

captures the agency costs considered by Jensen and Meckling (1976).

It will be

reasonable, then, to assume that
(11)

c (0)

= 0;

c (e) > 0, for e > 0; c' (e) ~ 0 and c" (e) ~ 0. 7

Let V represent the market value of the firm at the beginning of period t,
(a) before a wage rate for the skilled workers has been determined, and (b)
exclusive of any wealth costs that are captured by the cost function c(·).
Then, the net receipts from the sale of a portion e of the firm and, therefore,
the manager IS financial \{ealth at period t will be

An implication of (12) is that, for 0 < e ~ 1, the mmer-manager's wealth ,~
can have one of three possible values.

If the manager accepts the skilled

workers' demand,
~

(13a)

q(e)

= aV(w t

+

h)

+

eV - c(e).

If the manager rejects the skilled workers I demand and the skilled \wrkers

withdraw such a demand,
7According to Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 313), the \{ealth costs to the
owner-manager will be increasing as his fractional ownership falls. Among the
reasons given are: (a) the incentive of the manager to appropriate larger
amounts of the corporate resources in the form of perquisites, (b) costs for
monitoring his behavior, and (c) his declining incentive to devote significant
effort to "creative activities. I' To these reasons \.e can add that the
owner-manager's decision to sell part of his interest in the firm may signal
that there is trouble in the negotiation process with the employees.
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~

(13b)

'V(E)

= aY(\-lt)

EV - C(E).

+

Finally, if the manager rejects the skilled workers' demand and negotiations
break dmm,

WO(E) = aVo

(13c)

+

EV - C(E).

Since V is independent of the wage rate that will prevail for period t, so
is W
F. Therefore, with the proper substitutions of equations (13a) , (13b), and
(13c) into (6), the derivation of the manager's bargaining power at time t, ~IBt'
in (9) remains valid.

However, with (12), 'vF was seen to be a function of E.

Utilizing (13b) and (13c) ,

\-le

can \-lrite

(14)

As a preliminary to the general case, and in order to get an intuitive
understanding of the process, let us suppose for a moment that there are no
costs involved in selling a portion of the firm by the manager.
let us suppose that Y = V(w t ).
O
(13c), W

= aVo

+

EV(W t ).

On the other hand, for a

Then, from (13b) , W= Y(w t ), for any E, and from

Substituting into (14) we obtain

= 1,

In particular,

i.e., for E

U~I (V (\-l t) )YI

(w t )

UjI (V ( \-l t)) - UM(V o)

= 0,

In comparing the

t~o,

the case where a < 1, with the case where a = 1, it is

easily seen (see Appendix [A.2J) that concavity of the utility function implies
that
U~l (Y (1,T t) ) YI

>
UJ1(Y(w t )) - UJI(eY(w t )

+

aVo)

(h' t )

o
Uj1 (Y(I,Tt)) - UM(Y )

which means that the manager I s bargaining pOl,Ter all,Tays increases as he
substitutes OImership interest in the firm l,Tith financial l,Tealth.
,{ith Y = Y(w t ), and c(e)

= 0,

for all e, the manager would have nothing to

lose by selling a portion of the firm.

In fact, he could always guarantee

himself a wealth level equal to Y(w t ) with certainty if he were to sell the
entire firm. Therefore, l,Ti th free "insurance " in the event that negotiations
break down, together with the assumption that he is retained to negotiate the
l,age rate in his OIm best interest, the manager 1,0uld have nothing to lose by
rejecting any demand for an increase in the wage rate.

In particular, under the

current assumptions of this preliminary case, the manager could impose any l,Tage
rate, hO\,Tever low, as long as it exceeds the market wage rate wo ' so that
skilled workers would prefer employment l,Tith the firm.
Let us proceed now to examine the more realistic case where there are costs
involved In selling off a portion of the firm as

l,Te

have assumed in (11),

c(e) > 0.
Note that, Wee) - WO(e)

= a(Y(w t )

- yO).

Therefore, multiplying both the

numerator and the denominator of the right hand side of (14) by (Y(H t ) - yO),
setting U~I('{(e)) = b(e), (UjIC'{(e)) - UjI(wo(e)))/C'~T(e) - ,{o(e)) = B(e), and
(-Y'(\,Tt)/(Y(I,Tt) - yo))

=

A,

\,Te

can reHrite (14) as

15

(15)
for any given wage rate wt In the relevant range.
U

ulanager' s Utility Funct ion

FIGURE 3
In (15), A is independent of E, while, In the graph of the manager's
utility function, Figure 3, b(E) represents the slope at the wealth level '¥(E) ,
and B(E) represents the slope of the straight line joining the two points on the
graph corresponding to ,¥o(E) and W(E), respectively.

Therefore, for any given

\;age rate wt in the relevant range, the manager's bargaining pOl;er is
proportional [by a factor A = - VI (wt)/(V(w t ) - Vo)] to the ratio of the two
slopes, b(E)/B(E).

The slopes b and B represent the manager's feelings

concerning changes in wealth.

Specifically, b measures the manager's evaluation

of small changes in wealth at 1¥(E) while B measures the manager1s evaluation of
large changes in wealth over the range ,i to Vo . Recall that the manager's
bargaining pm.er is determined by his att itude tOl;ard small gains and large
losses.
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Now, for a strictly concave utility function, b(E) < B(E), for any E such
that 'V(E) > ,vo(E). In particular, if for E = 0, I,e I,rite V(w t ) = 'v(O) , and
Va = HO(0), then \{ (0) > HO (0), so, if the manager does not sell any port ion of
the firm, his bargaining p01,er is A(b (0) IB (0)) < A.

On the other hand as

tends to 1, both W(E) and 'vo(E) tend to the same certain wealth of
~

c(l)),

~

which implies that b(E) tends to UiI(V - c(1)), and B(E) tends to
[see Appendix (A.3)].

(\1_

E

U~I(V

- c(l))

Therefore, as the manager comes closer and closer to

selling the entire firm, i.e., as E tends to 1, b(E)/B(E) tends to 1, and MBt(E)
tends to A.
've have established that as the olmer- manager tends to be a pure manager,
i.e., as E tends to 1, his bargaining po\,er will be greater than in the case
where he retains ownership of the entire firm, i.e., for the case where E

= O.

The question is whether we can obtain a similar result for intermediate cases of

o < E < 1.
Observe that, for E > 0, the wealth functions In (13b) and (13c) are
Therefore, for E > 0,

differentiable.

fJ\{

(16)

(17)

'v r (E)

= - = V - V(w t ) - c' (E), and
OE
O\v o

,yO I(E)

=-

oE

= V - VO - c' (E) .

Assume that either HO, (E) ~ - HI(E) > 0, or HOI (E) > - HI (E) ~
~

Proposition 1:

0, for all E > 0.

Then, MBt(E) is an increasing function of E, E > O.

The results of Proposition 1 [see Appendix (A.4) for proof] in conjunction

j1I\ (0)

< A and 'IB t (E) tends to A as E tends to 1,
are sufficient to establish proposition 2.
\,i th the previous results that

17

Assume that either WOI (E) ~ - W' (E) > 0, or ~Ol (E) > - W' (E) ~

ProDosition 2.

0, for all E > 0.
for all

E

Then there exists an E,

°<E < 1, such that JIB t (E) > JIB t (0) ,
=

-

> E.

This establishes that a sufficiently large sell-off by the manager "ill
increase his bargaining po\{er.

Sufficient conditions for this result are that:

(a) the sell-off increases wealth in the event of a breakdown in negotiations
and reduces or leaves wealth unchanged "hen negotiations are successful; and (b)
the gain in \{ealth under a breakdmm in negotiations exceeds the loss in \{ealth
"hen negotiations are successful.
This condition may be interpreted (as in the preliminary case ,{here costs
were assumed to be zero) as a form of insurance in the event that negotiations
break do\m.

The "cost of insurance ll in the present case ,{QuId be - V' (E), the

reduct ion In \{ealth of the manager under the best- case outcome \{hen labor
concedes.
is VO I (E) .
costs.

The protection he receives, in the event that negotiations break down
Hence, our results here are similar to those ,{hen '.-e assumed no

The bargaining po\{er of the manager Increases as long as the protection

he receives in the event of a strike exceeds the cost of his lIinsurance."
-

Unless E
E <

=

° in Proposition 2, a sell-off of a small portion of the firm,

E may lower the manager's bargaining po,.-er. The reason is the presence of

lump-sum costs.

Suppose for a moment that lump-sum costs of

the manager sells part of his equity.
proceeds from the sale approach

~

are incurred when

Then from (12), as E approaches 0, the

°\.-hile costs approach

~.

Hence, regardless of

the outcome of negotiations, the manager's wealth is less than it ,{ould have
been under no sale of equity.

As a consequence, even though by Proposition 1,
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the manager I S bargaining pm,er is an increas ing funct ion of E: for
may be a range of E such that

~IBt (E)

stays belm,

~IB.t (0).

E

> 0, there

This occurs because

the manager's wealth is now lower due to the lump-sum cost

c. 8

Clearly since

lump sum costs lm,er the manager's bargaining pOl,er only when a sell- off makes
the manager unambiguously worst off, it is safe to assume that such an outcome
would be unlikely.
In the absence of lump-sum costs

~IBt(E)

> ~IBt(O).

More formally the

following proposition is valid.
ProDosition 3. Assume that (a) there are no lump-sum costs and (b) either
'i o , (E) f {i' (E) > 0 or 'i o , (E) > - ,i ' (E) f 0 for all E > o. Then ~IBt(E) > MBt(o) ,
for all E > O.
In conjunction with Proposition 1, Proposition 3 implies that the manager's
bargaining power increases as he sells a larger share of the firm and is always
larger than when he retains full ownership.
Let's now turn our attention to the effects of a sell-off on the value of
the firm.

The propositions above establish that under general conditions a

sell-off of the firm will, for any given I,age rate, increase the manager's
bargaining pmver.

This means that a sell- off I,ill shift the MB t curve
(initially presented in Figure 2) towards the northwest as depicted in Figure 4.

8~rathematically

the function

~IBt(E)

-

is not differentiable at E = 0 if c >

o.

19

~[B ...

I

L,

'f'

W

t

FIGURE 4
Recall from Section III ~ that the equilibrium l>1age is established at the
l>1age which equal izes the manager I s and labor I s bargaining pmier.

Hence the

sell-off I>1hich shifts the MB t curve northl>1est to MBi' results in a lowered
equilibrium wage of wt* '. Stockholders no,~ capture a larger portion of the
organizational rent, and as a result the value of the firm increases.

v.

Conclusions

In this paper we have demonstrated that the introduction of outside equity
In an ol>1ner-managed firm can increase its value.

The introduction of outside

equity, even at a cost, serves as insurance for the manager in the event that
negotiations break dOl>1n.

Since he no longer bears the entire cost, the

OImer- manager is more willing to risk a breakdOlm in negotiations to achieve
'~age

concessions from skilled labor.

Labor perceives this, and accepts a

Our assumptions preclude the possibility that the
current employees of the firm.

ne,~

10l~er

stockholders are the

An interesting extension 1>10uld be to examine hOI>1

the results reported here are altered if labor purchases a portion of the firm.

20

Appendix
To establish that the equilibrium wage rate wt* obtained by setting
MB t = LB t , is the same as that obtained from the Nash bargaining solution,
consider the first order condition for the maximization of the product

[A.1]

(Uil1 (aV(I.r t ) + 'iF) - Uil1(aVo + 'iF))· (UL(I.r t ) - UL(I.r O)) with respect to wt ·
Differentiating this product l.rith respect to wt and setting it equal to 0

l,Te

o
U~l(aV(wt) + WF) (aV' (l.r t )) (UL(w t ) - UL(I,TO)) + (UiIl(aV(w t ) + WF) - UiIl(aV +
'i F))·Ui,(I.r t ) = o. So, at the l,Tt* that solves this equation,
obtain:

Ui,( wt*)

aU~l (aY(Wt*) + 'iF) V' (1,1 *
t)

UL(I.r t* ) - UL(w o)
[A.2]

* + 'iF) - UiIl(aY 0 + W )
UilI (aV(I,Tt)
F

=

To prove that

----------- > 
UiIl(V(w t )) - UiIl(EY(W t ) + aVo)

Uil1(V(w t )) - UiIl(Vo)

multiply the nominator and denominator of the fraction on the right-hand side of
this inequality by a.

This will equalize the nominators of the tlvO fractions

and will make the denominator of the second equal to a(Uil1 (V(I,Tt)) - UiIl(Vo)).
Note that by the strict concavity of UiIl , UM(EY(I,Tt) + aVo) > EUil1(V(w t )) +

= 1-a,

UiIl(EY(w t ) + aVo) > UjI (V(I,Tt)) - a(Uil1 (V(I.r t )) - UM(Vo)),
\.rhich implies that a(UiIl (V(I.r )) - UiIl(Vo) > Uil1(V(w t )) - Uil1 (EV(W ) + aVo), lvhich
t
t
completes the proof.

aUilI(Vo).

[A.3]

Since E

To show that, as E ~ 1, (b(E)/B(E))

~

1, observe that, as E ~ 1,

both the nominator and the denominator of B(E) tend to 0, so that B(E) tends to
the indeterminate form (0/0).

However,
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limit (U~[(I{(E))I{' (E) - U~[(Iyro(E))IyrO, (E))

u~[6r - c(l))(I{' (1) - HOI (1))

=

E -; 1

limit (I{ I (E) - IyrO, (E)) = (I{ I (1) - HOI(1) ) .
E -; 1

But from (16) and (17), ('{' (E) - 'VOl (E)) = 

(V(w t ) - VO)

*0, for all E > 0.

Therefore,

By L'Hospitalls rule about indeterminate forms (0/0),
~

limit B(E)

= U~[ (V

- c (1))

=

b(1) .

E -; 1

[A.4] To prove that under the conditions of Proposition 1, the function
MBt(E) is an increasing function of E, note that for E > 0, both functions b(E)
and B(E) are differentiable.

Therefore, differentiating (15) with respect to E

we obtain
b l (E)B(E) - b(E)B'(E)
MBi(E) = A
(B(E))2
where primes denote first derivatives of the respective functions.
A > 0, and B(E) > 0, so, sign (MBi(E))

= sign

(b l (E)B(E) - b(E)BI (E)).

~

By definition, b(E)

= U~[(V(E)),

~

and this implies that b' (E)

~

,,,here, by assumption, U"nv(E)) < 0.
b l (E)

=

0 if WI (E)

=

0.

Note that

=

~

UiI(V(E))'v ' (E)

° if 'v' (E) < 0, and
~

Therefore, b l (E) >

Also by definition, B(E)

=

U~[(\{(E)) - UM(Ho(E)))/(\{(E)
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- WO(E)) >

° (see [1.3J).

A

Since W' (E) ~ 0, it follows that b l (E)B(E) >

~

WI (E) < 0, and b l (E)B(E) =
then, MBt(E) >
>

° if W' (E) =
A

0.

°provided that - b(E)B' (E) ~

°provided that -b(E)B I (E) >

° if

A

As a consequence, (a) if WI (E) < 0,
0, and (b) if WI (E) = 0, then MBt(E)

0.

Differentiate B(E) with respect to E to obtain
B' (E)

=

U~I (1{ (E) ) ,i I(E) - U~I (1,ro (E) ),,r0' (E) ) (,i (E)- WO(E) )- (Uj [ (W (E) )- UilI (1,ro (E) ) ) ('{' (E) - ,,r0' (E) )
(,i(E) - ,,ro(E))2
OI (E))/W(E) - wO(E)), and making use of the
Factoring out the term (WI (E) - W
definition of B(E), B' (E) can be written as

B' (E)
A

From (16) and (17), (,,r' (E) - ,,r0' (E))

= -

(\,(\,Tt) - yO), a negative number,

Hhile from the conditions of Proposition 1, WI (E) ~ 0, and ,,r0, (E) > 0.
Define 6(E) = - ,,r0, (E)/(,i' (E) - WOI (E)), so (l-6(E)) = ,if (E)/6{1 (E) 
WOI (E)). Then, 1/2 ~ 6(E) ~ 1, for each E. In particular, if WI (E) = 0, 6(E) =
1, while if WI (E) < 0, 6(E) ~ 1/2 (which follows from the conditions of
Proposition 1).

Substituting 6(E) and 1-6(E) for the corresponding terms In

B' (E) yields

NOI,T UiI(',r) is a convex function (i.e., U~I(1V) < 0, and U~II r (W) ~ 0).
Therefore

[U~r(I~(E))

O

+ 1/2(Uir(li (E)) -

U~1(1{(E)))J (1{(E) - l{o(E)) ~ (l\l(l~i(E)) 

U (1{0 ( E) ) ) .
ill
That is, the area under the straight line that connects any two different points
on the graph of Uir(V) is at least as great as the area under the graph between
those points.
Dividing both sides of the above inequality by (W(E) - l{o(E)), a positive
number for E < 1, we obtain
~

U~I(1{(E))

+ 1/2(UiI(I{0(E)) -

U~I(E))) ~

U (1\ (E) _ UjI (1{o ( E) )
ill

~

W( E) - VO (E)

= B(E).

HOIv'ever,

Therefore, if WI (E) < 0, b(E) ~ 1/2, and
UiI(I{(E)) +

8(E)(U~I(1{0(E)) - U~I(I{(E)) ~ B(E),

which implies that BI (E) ~ 0, while, if 1{1 (E)

= 0,

8(E)

= 1,

and

~

,~hich

implies that BI (E) < 0.

-b(E)B' (E) ~
the proof.

lEth b(E) =

U~r(V(E))

> 0, it fo1101vs that

° if WI (E) < 0, and -b(E)B ' (E) > °if ~I (E) = 0, which completes
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